Abstract: Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are also associated with greater banking system fragility.
I.

Introduction
The consolidation of banks around the globe is fueling an active public policy debate on the impact of consolidation on financial stability.
1 Indeed, economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between the concentration and the competitiveness of the banking industry and banking system fragility. Motivated by public policy debates and ambiguous theoretical predictions, this paper investigates empirically the impact of bank concentration and bank regulations on banking system stability.
Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less concentrated banking sector with many banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking sector with a few banks (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004) . First, concentrated banking systems may enhance market power and boost bank profits. High profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks and increase the charter or franchise value of the bank, reducing incentives for bank owners and managers to take excessive risk and thus reducing the probability of systemic banking distress (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 2000; Besanko and Thakor, 1993; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993, Matutes and Vives, 2000) . 2 Second, some hold that it is substantially easier to monitor a few banks in a concentrated banking system than it is to monitor lots of banks in a diffuse banking system. From this perspective, supervision of banks will be more effective and the risks of contagion and thus systemic crisis less pronounced in a concentrated banking system.
According to Allen and Gale (2000) , the U.S., with its large number of banks, supports this "concentration-stability" view since it has had a history of much greater financial instability than the U.K or Canada, where the banking sector is dominated by fewer larger banks. 3 An opposing view is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances bank fragility.
First, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that the standard argument that market power in banking boosts profits and hence bank stability ignores the potential impact of banks' market power on firm behavior. They confirm that concentrated banking systems enhance market power, which allows banks to boost the interest rate they charge to firms. Boyd and De Nicolo's (2005) theoretical model, however, shows that these higher interest rates may induce firms to assume greater risk. Thus, in many parameterizations of the model, Boyd, and De Nicolo (2005) find a positive relationship between concentration and bank fragility and thus the probability of systemic distress. Similarly, Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that less competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans and higher probability of failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty. Second, advocates of the "concentration-fragility" view argue that (i) relative to diffuse banking systems, concentrated banking systems generally have fewer banks 3 Some proponents of the "concentration-stability" view also argue that --holding other things constant -(i) banks in concentrated systems will be larger than banks in a more diffuse systems and (ii) larger banks tend to be better diversified than smaller banks. Based on these assumptions, this argument holds that concentrated banking systems characterized by a few large banks will be less fragile than banking systems with many small banks. It is important to emphasize that this argument is based on the assumption that all other things are held constant since bank size and banking system concentration depend on many factors. Models by Diamond (1984) , Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) , Boyd and Prescott (1986) , Williamson (1986) , Allen (1990) , and others predict economies of scale in intermediation. As discussed by Calomiris (2000) and Calomiris and Mason (2000) , an extensive literature finds an inverse relationship between bank scale and bank failure in the United States. However, empirical work by Chong (1991) and Hughes and Mester (1998) indicates that bank consolidation tends to increase the riskiness of bank portfolios. Boyd and Runkle (1993) , examining 122 U.S. bank holding companies, find that there is an inverse relationship between size and the volatility of asset returns, but no evidence that large banks are less likely to fail. De Nicoló (2000) , on the other hand, finds a positive and significant relationship between bank size and the probability of failure for banks in the U.S., Japan and several European countries. Thus, there are still open issues regarding the relationship between bank size and bank risk. Although we explore the sensitivity of our results to controlling for the mean bank size in each country, this paper focuses on providing the first empirical examination of the relationship between bank concentration, bank regulations, and crises, not on examining the relationship between bank size and diversification.
and (ii) policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks.
Based on these assumptions, banks in concentrated system will tend to receive larger subsidies through implicit "too important to fail" policies that intensify risk-taking incentives and hence increase banking system fragility (e.g., Mishkin, 1999) . 4, 5 Despite conflicting theoretical predictions and policy debates, there is no cross-country empirical evidence on bank concentration, bank competition and the incidence of systemic banking failures. For the U.S., Keeley (1990) provides evidence that increased competition following relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s resulted in an increase in large banks' risk profiles. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) , on the other hand, find that deregulation in the 1980s resulted in lower loan losses, while Dick (2003) finds higher loan loss provisions following deregulation in the 1990s. On the country level, De Nicoló et al. (2003) relate bank concentration to the fragility of the largest five banks in a country and find a positive relationship, suggesting that bank concentration leads to more bank fragility. They do not consider the incidence of systemic banking distress. 4 There is a literature that examines deposit insurance and its effect on bank decisions. According to this literature (e.g. Merton (1977) , Sharpe (1978) , Flannery (1989) , Kane (1989) , Keeley (1990) , Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) , Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002) ) -mis-priced deposit insurance produces an incentive for banks to take risk. If the regulatory treatment were the same for insured banks of all sizes, these models would predict no relationship between bank size and riskiness. Since regulators fear potential macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures, most countries have implicit "too large to fail" policies which protect all liabilities of very large banks whether they are insured or not. Thus, the largest banks frequently receive a greater net subsidy from the government (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990) . Even in the absence of deposit insurance, banks are prone to excessive risk-taking due to limited liability for their equity holders and to their high leverage (Stiglitz, 1972) . This subsidy may in turn increase the risk-taking incentives of the larger banks. For an analysis of the corporate governance of banks, see Macey and O'Hara (2003) . 5 Proponents of the concentration-fragility view would also disagree with the proposition that a concentrated banking system characterized by a few banks is easier to monitor than a less concentrated banking system with many banks. The countervailing argument is as follows. Bank size is positively correlated with complexity so that large banks are harder to monitor than small banks. Holding all other features of the economy constant, concentrated banking systems tend to have larger banks. Thus, this argument predicts a positive relationship between concentration and fragility. Again, this paper focuses on the aggregate relationship between bank concentration and crises. Although we control for bank size in our regressions, we do not examine the linkages between bank size and the ease of monitoring.
Using data on 69 countries over the period 1980-1997, this paper provides the first crosscountry assessment of the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. 6 Besides concentration, we examine international differences in bank capital regulations, restrictions on bank entry, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, and the overall institutional environment.
While we use cross-country differences in these bank regulations and institutions to assess the robustness of the relationship between concentration and crises, the results on regulations and institutions are independently valuable. Specifically, we provide some empirical evidence on which regulations and institutions are associated with bank stability.
The paper finds that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems. This is consistent with the concentration-stability theory's predictions. The negative relationship between concentration and crises holds when conditioning on macroeconomic, financial, regulatory, institutional, and cultural characteristics and is robust to an array of sensitivity checks. The data never provide support for the concentration-fragility view. When using only information about bank concentration and the economy prior to crises, we confirm the result, which suggests that the inverse relationship between concentration and crises is not driven by reverse causality.
Besides the results on concentration and crises, the data indicate that (i) fewer regulatory restrictions on banks -lower barriers to bank entry and fewer restrictions on bank activitiesreduce banking system fragility, and (ii) countries with national institutions that facilitate 6 Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentration and regulations on bank net interest margins, but they do not examine bank fragility. Earlier work on systemic banking instability has mostly focused on identifying (i) the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises (Gonzales-Hermosillo, et al., 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, henceforth DD) , (ii) the relationship between banking and currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) , (iii) the impact of financial liberalization on bank stability (DD, 1999) , and (iv) the impact of deposit insurance design on bank fragility (DD, 2002) . Barth et al. (2004) examine the relationship competition in general have a lower likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Thus, more competitive banking systems are associated with less banking system fragility. In terms of linking the results back to specific parts of the concentration-stability view, the finding that competition reduces fragility when controlling for concentration suggests that something else besides a positive relationship between bank concentration and bank profits is driving the negative relationship between bank concentration and banking system fragility. Our results also suggest that concentration might be an insufficient measure of competitiveness of the banking system.
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Given that this is an initial study of bank concentration and crises, these results must be qualified along a number of dimensions. First, we investigate systemic banking crises, which are very difficult to define and date. Consequently, we use different definitions of and dates for crises and obtain robust results. Nevertheless, future work that assesses the impact of the market structure of the banking industry and bank regulations on individual bank fragility will provide a valuable complement to and extension of our research. Second, in some specifications, we examine cross-country differences in bank regulatory policies and national institutions to (i) assess the robustness of the concentration-fragility relationship and (ii) provide information on the links between bank regulations, national institutions, and banking system crises. It is important to be cautious about these results, however, because the regulatory and institutional indicators are measured toward the end of the sample period. Thus, the regulatory and institutional variables are measured after some of the crises. This timing problem does not affect our primary results on bank concentration because the same results hold when these regulatory between bank regulations and crises, but they do not examine bank concentration and they use pure cross-country comparisons rather than panel analyses. 7 See also Claessens and Laeven (2004) who do not find any evidence for a negative relationship between bank concentration and a measure of bank competitiveness calculated from marginal bank behavior.
variables are excluded. Furthermore, some existing research that we review below finds that, except in a few countries, regulatory policies and national institutions have, in general, changed little over the last couple of decades. Nevertheless, future work that focuses on bank-level fragility while using detailed data on bank regulations and institutions will further contribute to our understanding of the determinants of banking crises. Third, this paper provides evidence that is consistent with concentration-stability theories, but inconsistent with models that emphasize the concentration-fragility view. Nonetheless, the empirical work does not explain exactly why concentration increases banking system stability. Future work needs to more fully dissect the channels through which concentration influences bank stability. Finally, while policy-relevant, this research provides an initial assessment of whether concentration is positively or negatively associated with crises and should not be taken as a recommendation for greater bank concentration. As noted, future research needs to examine exactly why concentration increases stability and also assess potential tradeoffs between greater stability and the adverse effects of greater market power before firm policy recommendations can be made regarding concentration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data set and presents summary statistics. Section III explains the methodology used in empirical tests.
Section IV contains the main results and Section V concludes.
II.
Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample covers the period 1980-1997 up to and including the East Asian crisis. The
Appendix provides more detailed variable definitions and data sources. Appendix Table 1 presents the country observations on GDP per capita, concentration, crisis periods and the reasons why the crisis was classified as systemic.
Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is going through a systemic crisis and zero if it is not. We use the DD (2002) As reported in Tables 1 and Appendix Table 1 , there is wide cross-country variation in the sample, with concentration levels ranging from less than 20 percent for the U.S. to 100 percent for many African countries, with a sample mean of 72%.
10 8 While recognizing that there is no single, unanimous definition of a systemic banking crisis, the primary goal of this paper is to provide the first cross-country assessment of the relationship between bank concentration and crises. Thus, we assess this link using different definitions of both crises and concentration. 9 Defining the economy as the relevant banking market abstracts from the fact that in some developed countries, such as the U.S. the relevant banking market is sub-national. Below, we control for this fact by testing the robustness of our results to dropping developed economies. This alternative measure of concentration is from the Barth et al (2004) survey database, which defines bank concentration as the share of deposits of the largest five banks. The correlation between the concentration measures calculated from Bankscope data and from Barth et al. is 52%, To investigate the relationship between banking crises and bank concentration, we control for many factors. Specifically, we begin with the econometric specification in DD (2002) and include the same regressors. Thus, we include the rate of growth of real GDP, the change in the external terms of trade, and the rate of inflation, to capture macroeconomic developments that are likely to affect the quality of bank assets. The short-term real interest rate is included to capture the banks' cost of funds. Also, higher real interest rates may affect bank profitability increasing default rates. Bank vulnerability to sudden capital outflows triggered by a run on the currency and bank exposure to foreign exchange risk are measured by the rate of exchange rate depreciation and by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves. Lagged credit growth is also a control since high rates of credit expansion may finance an asset price bubble that may cause a crisis when it bursts. We also include DD's (2002) index of moral hazard caused by deposit insurance generosity since they find that it contributes significantly to financial fragility.
11 Finally, GDP per capita is used to control for the level of development of the country.
In addition to bank concentration, we augment the benchmark specification in DD by using measures of bank regulation and supervision, the competitiveness of the banking system and the economy in general, and a summary institutional index. Measures of bank regulation and supervision come from Barth et al., (2001 Barth et al., ( , 2004 . The data set is collected through surveys of government officials in the late 1990s. There is some evidence, however, that regulatory policies have not changed much in most countries. For instance Barth et al. (2001) show that the regulatory restrictions on bank activities did not change much following systemic crises.
Moreover, in the few cases when they did change, there was a change toward fewer regulatory restrictions. Thus, the timing of the Barth et al. (2001) data actually biases the results against finding a positive relationship between regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis.
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We use four measures of bank regulation and supervision.
Fraction of Entry Denied is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities. This is a measure of entry restrictions in banking and thus the contestability of the market. To the extent restricted entry increases bank profits, this variable would be associated with less fragility. If however, restricted entry induces inefficiencies in the banking market, it could also lead to greater fragility. Required Reserves is the ratio of bank assets that regulators require banks to hold as reserves. Banking systems with higher ratios of required reserves may be more stable since they aggregate index that increases with the generosity of the deposit insurance regime. The index varies over time since different countries adopted deposit insurance or revised its design features at different points in time. 12 Also, Carkovic and Levine (2002) show that the bank regulations that compose the Barth et al. (2001) survey have remained virtually unchanged in Chile during the decade of the 1990s.
Activity Restrictions
would have a greater buffer to absorb liquidity shocks. However, greater required reserves are also a tax on the banking system, which may lower profits and raise fragility.
Capital Regulatory Index is a summary measure of capital stringency and is given by the sum of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements. To the extent that book capital is an accurate measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile.
We also use three additional variables to capture the extent of banking freedom and general economic freedom and the institutional environment.
Banking Freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system.
Specifically, it is a composite index of whether foreign banks are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance products and invest in securities. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking freedoms. On the one hand, fewer official impediments to bank operations and entry could stimulate efficiency and diversification that promotes stability. On the other hand, greater banking freedom could induce destabilizing competition.
Economic Freedom is an indicator of how a country's policies rank in terms of providing economic freedoms. It is a composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. Higher scores indicate polices more conducive to competition and economic freedom.
To the extent freedoms allow banks to improve efficiency and to engage in different activities and diversify their risks, we expect increased level of freedoms to reduce fragility. However, it is also true that greater freedoms allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if the underlying institutional environment and existing regulations and supervision distort risk-taking incentives. Thus, overall greater freedom may also lead to greater bank fragility. Both Banking and Economic Freedom are available from the Heritage Foundation, are built on expert opinions, and are average values for the 1995-97 period.
KKZ_Composite is an index of the overall level of institutional development constructed by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). The underlying indicators are voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This index is available for 1998. We expect better institutions to lead to reduced bank fragility, controlling for all other factors.
Finally, we control for other national characteristics that the literature has identified as being closely linked to financial sector development. Specifically, we control for British, French and German Legal Origin, which are dummies that take on the value one for the respective legal tradition. British legal origin countries have to be found to have more flexible legal systems and thus better-developed financial systems (La Porta et al., 1997 , Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2003a , 2003b Easterly and Levine (2003) , and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) show that endowments influence institutional and financial development. Finally, we control for Ethnic Fractionalization, since Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic diversity tends to reduce the provision of public goods, including the institutions that support the contracting environment.
III. Methodology
In estimating the crisis model, we follow DD (1998, 2002) and use a logit probability model that is robust to heteroskedasticity. 13 Using this model of banking crisis, we can test the hypothesis that bank concentration and competition have an impact on fragility when controlling for other factors. Thus, we estimate the probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular country, assuming that this probability is a function of the explanatory variables (X(i,t)). Let P(i, t) denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t and a value of zero otherwise. β is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(β'X(i, t)) is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at β'X(i, t). 14 Then, the log-likelihood function of the model is:
While the sign of the estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable indicates whether an increase of that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis, the estimated coefficients do not indicate the magnitude of the impact of a marginal change in the explanatory variable on the probability of a crisis. Instead, the coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(1-P(i,t))), so that the magnitude of the impact on the probability of a crisis depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at β'X(i,t). Therefore, the magnitude of the change in the probability of a crisis depends on the initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients. Thus, in the analyses below, we present marginal coefficient estimates that are computed at the sample mean. These sample mean estimates illustrate the economic magnitudes of the relationship between each explanatory variable and the probability of a systemic banking crisis evaluated at the sample mean.
In subsequent tables, we explore the potential non-linearity of the crisis-concentration relationship, and discuss the robustness of our results to different samples, definitions of concentration, and to controlling for reverse causality. Then, we investigate the impact of bank concentration and different regulatory, competition and institutional variables on banking system fragility. Finally, we also analyze if the impact of concentration on the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis is robust to controlling for an array of country factors.
IV. Results
A. Main findings
In the basic regressions presented in Table 2 , banking system concentration enters the regressions negatively and significantly. Regression (1) presents the results when (i) including the standard explanatory variables and (ii) using the conventional logit output. Regression (2) adds concentration. 15 Concentration enters with a significant negative coefficient throughout. In sum these analyses lend no support to the view that concentration induces banking system instability. Rather, the results suggest that concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable to banking crises.
In columns (3) - (5), we test the sensitivity of our findings to the treatment of subsequent crisis years. In column (3), we include all the crisis period observations and treat them as crisis observations. In column (4), we include all the crisis period observations and treat them as noncrisis observations. In column (5), finally, we weigh the crisis observations by the length of the crisis. In all cases, our finding of a negative and significant relationship between bank concentration and crisis probability is confirmed.
The estimates also suggest that the economic impact is large. Regression (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in concentration (0.2) leads to a decrease in the probability of a crisis of one percent (-0.01=0.2*-0.05). Since crisis probabilities at any point in time are quite low, with a mean value of five percent, this is a substantial reduction. When including the crisis years in the analyses, the estimated effect of a one standard deviation in bank concentration leads to a reduction in the predicted probability of a crisis of three percent, compared to a sample mean of 18 percent for the sample that includes the years of the crisis. This result is supportive of the concentration-stability view that concentration fosters a more stable banking system.
Among the control variables, GDP growth and per capita GDP enter negatively, while the real interest rates enter positively, as suggested by economic theory and earlier empirical studies.
Credit growth is positive, but significant only at the ten percent level, which lends weak support to the argument that credit booms signal future fragility. While moral hazard enters positively and significantly in column (1), indicating that deposit insurance design influences banking system stability, it loses significance in some specifications when controlling for bank concentration. A strong negative correlation between concentration and moral hazard might explain the loss of significance of moral hazard. The fit of the model is satisfactory given the difficulty of the task, and the benchmark specification with concentration classifies 66 percent of all observations and 73 percent of crisis observations accurately. 16 Pseudo R-squares range between x to y depending on specification. The mean predicted probability for crisis observations is .116, whereas it is .04 for non-crisis observations. The estimated crisis probability increases prior to the crisis, and the mean for three years prior to crisis is .05.
B. Sensitivity analyses
To check for a quadratic relationship between concentration and crises, Table 3 's regression (1) adds concentration-squared to the standard specification. For brevity, we only present the results on the concentration variables. Each of the regressions in Table 3 , however, contains the standard controls from Table 3 's regression (2). When including the squared term, concentration is negative and significant at the ten percent level, while the squared concentration term is positive and insignificant. 15 We also ran the column (2) regression without GDP per capita with almost identical results. 16 In classifying observations, predicted probabilities significantly higher than five percent (number of crisis observations divided by total number of observations which equals the sample mean of the crisis dummy) are classified as crisis observations and those below five percent are classified as no crisis.
Next, NPL as well crisis cost criteria (crisis costs >2 % of GDP) and re-classify all these observations as non-crisis observations, the coefficient on concentration is still negative and significant at 7
percent.
There may exist concerns regarding reverse causality. This would be the case if systemic crises led to lower levels of concentration in the banking system through greater entry or changes in general competition policies. Although we check the robustness of the results here, it is important to reiterate why we use average concentration over the period 1988-1997 for the bulk of the analyses rather than using annual observations. The sample of banks covered by
Bankscope changes over the sample period. Thus, measured changes in concentration may reflect changes in coverage, not changes in actual concentration. If these measurement problems resulting from the changing sample of banks are important, then using annual data will induce an errors in variables problem that biases the results toward finding an insignificant relationship.
Nevertheless, we undertake the following sensitivity analyses. First, we inspect individual crisis cases in our sample. We do not see a significant pattern of reduced concentration after crisis episodes, and indeed the data suggest that concentration generally varies little over time.
Nevertheless, to assess issues of reverse causality more formally, we estimate a specification where we define concentration as the initial level of concentration (1988 or the first available year in the data) instead of the 1988-97 average. Table 4 regression (3) shows that this does not change our results significantly: concentration is negatively associated with the likelihood of suffering a crisis.
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As additional robustness checks, we use two different definitions of concentration.
Specifically, first we use the three-bank Herfindahl index of concentration. Note, that calculating the Herfindahl index using all of the banks in the sample is problematic because the sample of banks changes over time. Nevertheless, even with this alternative definition, the data do not provide support to the view that concentration increases fragility. Concentration continues to indicate a negative and significant (at the ten percent level) relationship between concentration and crises (column 4). Finally, in column (5) we use an alternative measure of concentration obtained from Barth et al. (2004) . This measure, obtained through surveys of bank regulators, is calculated as the fraction of deposits held by the five largest commercial banks in each country as of end-1999. We expect this measure not to suffer from problems of differential coverage in each country since the source is the bank regulators themselves. Unfortunately, this measure is only available for a subset of our countries significantly reducing both the sample size and number of crises, however the results remain essentially unchanged with concentration entering with a significant and negative coefficient at ten percent despite the smaller sample.
18 Since some of the crisis episodes occur before the date beginning date of data on concentration, we re-ran the regression without those crisis episodes that precede the initial concentration date. This leaves us with only 20 crisis episodes and less than half of the total number of observations, yet the concentration variable still remains negative and significant. We also confirm our results using annual data.
Thus far, we have allowed for heteroskedasticity of errors and corrected for it, but assumed that the errors are independent. However, given that we use a panel data set, the error terms within individual countries may be correlated with each other. To control for the fact that omitted country-level characteristics might cause correlation of the error terms within countries, Table 4 , column (6) reports results that allow for clustering within countries. Specifically, we do not require that the error terms are independent; rather, we require that error terms are independent across countries but not necessarily within countries. Concentration still enters with a negative and significant coefficient.
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We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to using alternative samples. In column (7) of Table 4 , we exclude from the sample all countries with populations less than 20 million.
The coefficient on concentration remains negative and significant. 20 In column (8), we exclude all African countries since they tend to have very high bank concentration ratios. We see that our results are not driven by African observations. In column (9), we exclude all developed countries (as defined by the World Bank's World Development Report) from the analysis.
21
Again, we see that concentration significantly reduces fragility also in the sample of developing countries.
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Finally, we control for Bank Size, which equals total banking system assets divided by the number of banks in billions of US$. If concentration is simply proxying for the average size of banks in a country, then including Bank Size will drive out the significance of concentration in the systemic banking crises regression. Regression (9), however, indicates that concentration 19 We also estimated a logit model with random country effects. Again, the results are not significantly different and we cannot reject the Hausman null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients estimated using random country errors and those using fixed effects estimations are not systematic. 20 Eliminating countries with less than 1 million or less than 10 million inhabitants yielded similar results. 21 Eliminating the G10 countries produces similar results.
continues to enter negatively and significantly even when controlling for Bank Size, while Bank Size does not enter significantly.
C. Concentration, regulations, institutions, and crises
In Table 5 , we control for different bank regulations and the institutional environment.
23
We include indicators of bank regulations for three reasons. First, controlling for differences in national policies provides a simple robustness test of the relationship between concentration and crises. Second, controlling for regulations provides additional information on the concentrationfragility relationship. If concentration is proxying for regulations that impede competition, then controlling for the regulatory environment will drive out the significance of concentration in the crisis regression and therefore explain why we find a significant, negative coefficient on concentration. Finally, examining the relationship between bank regulations and banking system stability is independently valuable. Countries implement regulations to promote banking system stability. This research provides some information about which policies work.
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The Table 5 results indicate that the negative relationship between banking system concentration and the probability of suffering a systemic banking crisis holds even when including measures of the regulatory environment, the general openness of the banking industry, the degree of economic freedom in the economy, and a general index of institutional 22 We also tested the sensitivity of our findings to outliers. Specifically, we excluded Ivory Coast (1993) because their M2/reserves values are outliers and Peru (1991) because its inflation and real interest rate values are outliers. Our findings are confirmed. Further, when we lag all observations by one period, our results are again confirmed. 23 We also control for public and foreign ownership. While we cannot find a robust relationship between the ownership structure and banking system stability, controlling for the ownership structure does not affect our main finding of a negative relationship between concentration and crisis probability. 24 These specifications exclude GDP per capita since it is also a proxy for the overall institutional environment, including bank regulations. We have also estimated specifications where we have left out the concentration variable and included only the regulation and supervision variables one at a time. The results on these variables are virtually unchanged, thus we do not report them for brevity.
development. 25 When controlling for capital regulations, reserve requirements, regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, banking freedom, economic freedom and a summary measure of institutional development, concentration enters negative and significantly at the five percent level. We also include information on the fraction of entry applications denied as an indicator of impediments to the entry of new banks. Although this dramatically cuts the sample, concentration enters negatively and significantly at the ten percent level.
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The Table 5 results also indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory restrictions on bank activities boost bank fragility. These are consistent with the results obtained by Barth et al. (2004) , who examine the impact of entry restrictions on crises in a purely crosscountry investigation that does not control for bank concentration. A higher fraction of entry applications denied -a proxy for tighter entry regulations -leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking system. This is consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the efficiency of the banking system, also making it more vulnerable to external shocks. Similarly, we find that restrictions on bank activities increase crisis probabilities. This result indicates that overall these restrictions prevent banks from diversifying outside their traditional business, reducing their ability to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios. The required reserves and capital regulatory index do not enter with significant coefficients.
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The variables that capture the general openness and competitiveness of the banking system and the economy enter with negative and very significant coefficients (Table 5 regressions 5-7). Thus countries with greater freedoms in banking and generally more 25 Bank concentration remains significantly, negatively associated with bank fragility even when simultaneously controlling for the regulatory variables and the institutional development indicators, but the intersection of these regulatory and institutional variables cuts the number of observations virtually in half. 26 In unreported regressions we have also explored specifications where we have interacted the concentration variable with these regulatory and institutional variables, but the interaction terms did not enter significantly.
competitive economic policies are less likely to experience banking crises. This is the case despite the fact that these policies also tend to reduce entry barriers and are correlated with reduced levels of bank concentration. A better institutional environment is also associated with a lower probability of systemic crisis, as expected. In regression (8), we include the various combinations of the institutional indicators simultaneously. As shown, there is multicollinearity across the different institutional variables (though they jointly enter significantly). Even when simultaneously including these controls, however, concentration enters negatively and significantly. The evidence is consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing effects of competition, but inconsistent with the many models that stress the destabilizing effects from competition.
Finally, in Table 6 , we explore the linkages between systemic banking crises and concentration while controlling for other national characteristics that may explain institutional development, such as legal origin, religious composition, geography, and ethnic diversity.
Results in Table 6 show that controlling for these factors does not change the results on concentration. Concentration remains negative and significant. The negative relationship between banking system concentration and systemic crises remains negative and significant even when all of these factors are included simultaneously (regression 5). The results in Table 6 also indicate that countries closer to the equator and thus a less favorable geography for institution building face a higher crisis probability, while there is weak evidence that countries with a higher share of Catholic population have a lower probability of systemic banking distress.
The findings that (i) concentration lowers banking system fragility and (ii) low competition raises banking system fragility imply that future research needs to move beyond a simple "concentration-stability" versus "concentration-fragility" debate where concentration is viewed as a simple proxy for market power. More specifically, one standard view holds that concentrated banking systems reduce banking system fragility by boosting the profits of banks.
Recall, however, that this paper finds that (i) concentration remains negatively associated with banking system fragility when controlling for regulations and institutions associated with competition and (ii) these indicators of competition are associated with greater banking system stability. If our regulatory and institutional indicators do a reasonably good job of measuring the competitiveness of the banking industry, then these results (i) are inconsistent with the argument that concentration enhances stability by boosting the market power of banks and (ii) indicate that concentration is measuring "something else" besides market power. We hope that future studies at the individual bank-level can identify why bank concentration is negatively correlated with bank fragility even after controlling for the degree of competition in the banking industry.
V. Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration on banking system fragility. We use cross-country data on 69 countries and 47 crisis episodes. The paper conducts an array of sensitivity analyses that extend the core results.
The results are consistent with concentration-stability theories but are inconsistent with the concentration-fragility views. These initial analyses indicate that national bank concentration tends to reduce the likelihood that a country will suffer a systemic banking crisis. The results hold when controlling for a wide array of macroeconomic, regulatory and institutional factors, each other.
when using different definitions of crises and concentration, and after examining different subsamples of countries.
In terms of regulations and institutions, the data do not support the view that more competition increases fragility. Quite to the contrary, the results indicate that banking systems where a larger fraction of entry applications are denied, and those where regulations restrict banks from engaging in non-loan making activities have a greater likelihood of experiencing a systemic crisis. Similarly, in terms of national institutions, the regressions indicate that countries with better-developed institutions that foster competition are less likely to suffer systemic banking crises. The finding that both concentration and competitiveness of the banking system is positively related to banking stability suggests that bank concentration is an insufficient measure of bank competitiveness.
While our paper shows that more concentrated banking systems are less likely to suffer systemic crises, we do not explore the mechanisms. While policy-relevant, our findings should therefore not be seen as recommendation for policymakers to foster bank concentration. Future research has to examine the channels through which concentration and the competitiveness of the financial system impact stability.
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panel B and C. Banking crisis is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Fraction of entry applications denied is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities. Activity restrictions measures the degree to which a bank is restricted from engaging in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and from real estate investment, management, and development. Required reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require banks to hold. Capital regulatory index measures capital stringency in the banking system. State ownership measures the percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned, while foreign ownership measures percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign owned. Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system. Economic freedom is a composite measure of institutional factors determining economic freedom. KKZ_composite is a composite measure of governance indicators. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. Table 2 .
Banking Crisis and Concentration
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t] = α + β 1 Real GDP growth j,t + β 2 Terms of trade change j,t + β 3 Real interest rate j,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5 M2/reserves j,t + β 6 Depreciation j,t + β 7 Credit growth j,t-2 + β 8 Real GDP per capita j,t +β 9
Moral Hazard Index j,t +β 10 Average concentration j,t + ε j,t . The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. Specification (3) includes the crisis period as crisis observations. Specification (4) includes the crisis period (after the initial crisis year) as non-crisis observations. Specification (5) weights crisis years by duration of crisis. We present the marginal effects (dy/dx) of the logit regressions. White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1) The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t) = α + β 1 Real GDP growth j,t + β 2 Terms of trade change j,t + β 3 Real interest rate j,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5 M2/reserves j,t + β 6 Depreciation j,t + β 7 Credit growth j,t-2 + β 8 Real GDP per capita j,t +β 9 Moral Hazard Index j,t +β 10 Average concentration j,t + β 11 concentration 2 j,t + ε j,t . The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. In columns (2) and (3) we run piece-wise regressions where concentration is split into quintiles or deciles and entered 5 or 10 times, each time multiplied by a dummy that takes the value 1 for each quintile or decile. White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1) The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t) = α + β 1 Real GDP growth j,t + β 2 Terms of trade change j,t + β 3 Real interest rate j,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5 M2/reserves j,t + β 6 Depreciation j,t + β 7 Credit growth j,t-2 + β 8 Real GDP per capita j,t +β 9 Moral Hazard Index j,t +β 10 Average concentration j,t + ε j,t . The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980 uses an alternative definition of crisis which also includes borderline crises, based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) . In specification (2), we reclassify those countries whose only criteria for crisis classification is non-performing loans > 10%. In specification (3), Average Concentration is replaced by Initial Concentration, for the entire sample period. In specification (4) the concentration measure used is the Herfindahl index for the top 3 banks. In specification (5) concentration is replaced by the concentration data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) . . Specification (6) relaxes the assumption of independent error terms within countries (clustering). In specification (7) the sample excludes all countries with populations less than 20 million. In specification (8) the sample excludes all developed countries. In specification (9), we control for mean bank size, which is given in billions of US$. White's heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t) = α + β 1 Real GDP growth j,t + β 2 Terms of trade change j,t + β 3 Real interest rate j,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5 M2/reserves j,t + β 6 Depreciation j,t + β 7 Credit growth j,t-2 + β 8 Moral Hazard Index j,t +β 9 Concentration j,t + β 10 Regulatory measures j,t + ε j,t . The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. The Regulatory measures in specifications (1)-(4) -Fraction of entry applications denied, Activity restrictions, Required reserves and Capital regulatory index, -are included (one at a time) as regressors. Fraction of entry applications denied measures the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the total applications received. Activity restrictions measures the degree to which banks are restricted from engaging in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and from real estate investment, management, and development. Required reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require banks to hold. Capital regulatory index is a summary measure of capital stringency. White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t) = α + β 1 Real GDP growth j,t + β 2 Terms of trade change j,t + β 3 Real interest rate j,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5 M2/reserves j,t + β 6 Depreciation j,t + β 7 Credit growth j,t-2 +β 8 Moral hazard index j,t + β 9 Concentration j,t + β 10 Historical Determinants ,t + ε j,t . The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise. Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP. Terms of trade is changes in terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation. Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator. M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves. Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods. Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate. Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. The Historical determinants in specifications-Legal origin, Latitude, Religion, and Ethnic -are included (one at a time) as regressors and then all together. Legal origin are three dummies UK, France and Germany, which take the value 1 for each legal origin respectively. Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of each country normalized to lie between zero and one. Religion includes three variables, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant which indicate the percentage of the population that follows a particular religion. Ethnic is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will not speak the same language. White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix.
(1) and Levine (1997) 
